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THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MUNICIPAL AIRPORTS: A SUBJECT OF
FEDERAL MANDATE?
LEE L. BLACKMAN*
ROGER P. FREEMAN**

I.

INTRODUCTION

ECTION 1108(a) OF THE Federal Aviation Act'(Act)
states "The United States of America is declared to
possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States." 2 The Act
grants the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) broad authority to regulate the airways and
their users "in order to insure the safety of aircraft and
'
the efficient utilization of such airspace. '
The Act does not purport to nationalize the country's
local airports. While the FAA correctly regards these facilities as essential to our air transportation system, they are
not "national" airports. Indeed, they exist only because
local communities provided the land upon which they sit,
taxed themselves so that the facilities might initially be
constructed, and made a commitment to live, up to a
point, with their environmental consequences. So far, the
* Lee L. Blackman, McDermott, Will & Emery; J.D., 1975 University of Southern California.
** Roger P. Freeman, Deputy City Attorney for the City of Long Beach; J.D.,
1971 University of California at Los Angeles. The views expressed are those of the
authors alone.
I Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C. app.).
2 49 U.S.C. app. § 1508(a) (1982).
."Idat § 1348(a).
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system of shared authority over the noise generated by
the aircraft which use both federal airspace and local airports has left to the airport proprietor the determination
of where that "point" is to be located.
The FAA's Chief Counsel, E. Tazwell Ellett, now warns
us that continuation of this scheme of shared (and necessarily self-interested) authority over the airport and airspace elements of the national air transportation system
has led to a "'patchwork quilt' of local airport use restrictions which may ultimately ... strangle its vitality."'4 It is
the premise of this response that Mr. Ellett's eulogy is
premature- and that the present allocation of powers is:
(1) logical; (2) as effective as any alternative; and (3) the
only system which is consistent with the principles of federalism embodied in the Supreme Court's commerce
clause cases. Moreover, so long as Congress declines to
preempt local authority over the environmental consequences of aircraft operations and assume the vistas of financial liability which currently accompany airport
proprietorship, airports must to be able to choose for
themselves where to draw the line between the need for
interstate commerce and the desire for peaceful and stable communities. This degree of local autonomy is neces- Ellett, The NationalAir TransportationSystem: Design By City Hall?, 53 J. AiR L. &
COM. 1, 27 (1987). The sorts of regulations at issue include programs to exclude
from the airport the loudest classes of aircraft (either all of the time or during the
most noise-sensitive hours), limits on the types and number of aircraft operations,
the relocation of runways, the construction of noise barriers, the expenditure of
funds to acquire properties or alter them to reduce interior noise, and the encouragement of runway utilization and preferential flight track programs which limit
the number of flights over residential areas. While these efforts have been pursued assiduously, the conclusion is inescapable that it is impossible, not to mention economically impractical, to satisfy everyone. Thus, local homeowners have
aggressively pushed for additional noise reduction programs and for direct limitations on airport growth.
-1This "patchwork quilt" analogy was first suggested by the aviation industry in
a January 16, 1979 petition by the Air Transport Association for the adoption of
federal regulations precluding proprietor noise restrictions unless the FAA found
them to be necessary and appropriate. 44 Fed. Reg. 52,076 (1979). Proprietors
and local authorities thus usually take a skeptical view of the Air Transport Association's recently renewed claim (see FAA Rulemaking Docket 24,246, reprintedin 49
Fed. Reg. 36,186 (1984)) that the system is finally about to suffer the imminent
breakdown predicted almost a decade ago.
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sary even if it results in a national air transportation
system "so inefficient and costly to operate that it would
have to cease to exist as we know it today."
Since Mr. Ellett only discusses generally the present allocation of authority over noise-based restrictions on access to the nation's airports, we will endeavor to describe
it in some detail, with special emphasis on two principal
questions. First, to what extent has federal action preempted local discretion to control noise and access to the
airport? Second, to the extent proprietors retain discretion to adopt "reasonable" regulations, whose view of
reasonableness is controlling? A close examination of
these subjects is essential to an understanding of the issues of federalism which are implicated in Mr. Ellett's call
"to reverse the current trend [toward added local control
over the environmental impacts of aircraft operations]
'7
and cure this problem before it causes major damage.
Except as discussed below, we generally accept Mr. Ellett's analysis of the roles of the various players in the process, their perceptions of their objectives, and the
pressures under which they attempt to achieve their
objectives.

II.

SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND

Mr. Ellett suggests that a majority of the current

problems of airport access and capacity, as they relate to
noise, could have been avoided if local municipalities had
utilized their land use planning and zoning powers effectively.8 To the contrary, however, the arrival of the commercial jet airplane and the nature and extent of its effects
were not, and could not have been, foreseen in time "to
ensure that only compatible land uses were allowed to exist around an airport." Almost all of this country's principal airports were planned and constructed during an era
" Ellett,

supra note 4, at 21.
" Ellett, supra note 4 at 29.
" Ellett, supra note 4, at 19.
o Ellett, supra note 4, at 20.
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of considerably smaller and quieter aircraft. Communities
simply perceived no need to acquire the substantial quantities of adjacent property now needed to buffer residential communities from the consequences of the jet age.
Irrespective of the foreseeability question, other circumstances guaranteed that proprietors would not be able to
exercise the influence necessary to avoid exposing local
communities to excessive noise. Several of the country's
primary airports are neither owned nor operated by the
cities or counties in which they are located. Many airports
are operated by agencies which lack the powers of zoning
and condemnation, and virtually all of our major airports
are close enough to adjoining municipalities to burden at
least some property owners whose votes cannot directly
influence airport management.' 0
Mr. Ellett's inquiry as to who should "bear the cost of
solutions to problems created by local governments' failure to properly exercise this [land use] authority"'" thus
proceeds from a questionable premise. It assumes both
the forseeability of the advent of high frequency commercial jet operations and the existence of resources sufficient
to accommodate them. In any event, the issue of who
should bear the costs of, and exercise authority over, the
adverse consequences of noise has nothing to do with
fault and everything to do with principles of federalism.
These principles were at the foundation of the only
Supreme Court decision to address this issue directly, the
case which sets the legal context for this analysis, City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 12
The inability, and the perceived lack of inclination of
the private owner of the Hollywood-Burbank Airport
- Even in cases where the proprietor also controls local land use, the economic
need for development and the political power of those who seek such permission
frequently makes it difficult for cities to refuse otherwise beneficial development
proposals.
Ellett, supra note 4, at 4.
411 U.S. 624 (1973). At issue in this case was the validity of a Burbank city
ordinance prohibiting take offs by jet aircraft from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.
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(now the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport) to avoid
the problems of noise associated with the advent of air
service by jets led the City Council of Burbank to use its
governmental powers (generally referred to as "police
powers") to reduce the environmental impacts of the airport. The effort was rejected as being contrary to the
supremacy and commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court determined that a municipality which neither owned nor operated an airport located within its boundaries was preempted from adopting
an ordinance which would preclude jet aircraft operations
at night.'Relying upon the Federal Aviation Act's undisputed
preemption of airspace management 14 and the power of
the FAA to prescribe regulations to mitigate the noise of
aircraft operations, 15 Justice Douglas concluded, for the
majority, that "the pervasive nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise ... leads us to conclude
s See also San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal.
1978) (upholding a preliminary injunction forbidding the California Department
of Transportation from conditioning the grant of a variance from certain state
laws on the adoption of a more restrictive jet aircraft curfew), aft'd, 651 F.2d 1306
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1000 (1982); Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389
F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding the State of California's in flight noise regulations to be a per se invalid exercise of police power because such regulatory
power is exclusively in the federal domain); American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding town noise ordinance invalid as
a contravention of federally granted freedom of transit through navigable airspace
regardless of the fact that the ordinance was enacted for purposes related to local
order and public health), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1017 (1969); County of Cook v. Priester, 22 Il1. App. 3d 964, 318 N.E.2d 327
(1974) (holding a county ordinance imposing a weight limitation on aircraft invalid as a contravention of the supremacy clause), aft'd, 62111. 2d 357, 342 N.E.2d 41
(1976).
1, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1348, 1508 (1982). Section 1348 provides that the Secretary of Transportation is authorized to develop plans for the use of the navigable
airspace and to prescribe rules for the flight of aircraft. Id. § 1348. Section 1508,
as noted at the outset, states that "[t]he United States of America is declared to
possess and exercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace
of the United States." Id. § 1508.
I&Id. § 1431. Section 1431 provides that the FAA, after consulting with the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), shall prescribe regulations to control and abate aircraft noise and sonic
boom. Id
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that there is pre-emption."1 6 The apparent breadth of the
Court's language, however, is limited by the majority's acknowledgment that Congress never intended to overturn
the "right of a State or local public agency, as the proprietor
of an airport, [to] issu[e] regulations or establish[] requirewhich can be
ments as to the permissible level of noise
17
airport."
the
using
aircraft
by
created
The exception to preemption which allows airport proprietors to adopt noise control regulations derives, at
least in part, from earlier Supreme Court cases determining that the airport, rather than the operators of noisy aircraft, should be responsible for paying compensation in
the event aircraft noise becomes substantial enough to
constitute a taking of property under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 8 Refusing to address a subject not
directly raised in this case, however, the Burbank Court did
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633.
Id at 635 n.14 (quoting S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968)).
18 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (low flights over a chicken
farm by United States' military planes made the property unusable for that purpose and constituted a "taking," in the constitutional sense, which required compensation). The Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369
U.S. 84 (1962) (wherein the airport proprietor, and not the federal government, is
held responsible for noise impact problems caused by the proprietor's airport), is
generally regarded as the genesis of the "proprietor exception" to the rule of
federal preemption of aircraft noise control. In Griggs, the proprietor, and not the
federal government, was held liable because the proprietor had "decided, subject
to approval of the C.A.A. (Civil Aeronautics Administration, predecessor of the
FAA], where the airport would be built, what runways it would need, their direction and length, and what land and navigation easements would be needed." Id.
at 89. An obligation to acquire easements for noise was seen as an additional
facet of the proprietor's duty to purchase sufficient private property to operate the
airport. Id. The proprietor's constitutional responsibility for takings caused by
aircraft noise has been the subject of many cases. See, e.g., Nestle v. City of Santa
Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972); Loma Portal Civil
Club v. American Airlines, 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964);
Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 223 Or. 178, 376
P.2d 100 (1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). The proprietor's liability was expanded in Baker
v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 218
Cal. Rptr. 293 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1200 (1986), Greater Westchester
Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 733 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980), and Aaron, 40 Cal. App. 3d at
471, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 162, to include nuisance and personal injury damages.
it

7
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not consider "what limits, if any, apply to a municipality
as a proprietor."' 9
The Burbank decision thus left open a number of important questions concerning proprietor power, including:
(1) whether the municipal airport owner may exercise the
police powers denied to governments which are not proprietors or is limited to the use of the rights which derive
solely from its status as the owner of the property on
which the airport is located; 20 and (2) whether the fact
that the proprietor may regulate noise only because of its
status as the owner of the airport affects the presumption
of validity to which its ordinances are otherwise entitled
and thus the level ofjudicial deference to be accorded its
noise regulations. 2 1 The answers to these questions will
ultimately determine whether, absent further action in
Congress, federal or local decisionmakers will hold the
controlling authority to dictate the extent to which interstate commerce may be burdened in the interests of local
environmental quality.
III.

THE PRESENT ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE NOISE AND ACCESS

A.

FederalPreemption And Its Limits, ProprietorPower and
Its Sources.
The authority to control noise and access is presently

19Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 n.14.
-0Under the narrowest definition, elimination of the police power would leave
the airport only those rights to regulate airport use which could be predicated
upon the proprietor's property ownership. Absent police power, it would be
obliged to attempt to negotiate lease conditions or other limitations on use of
airport property in order to limit noise. The enforcement of these restrictions
would be by civil suit. In these suits the state court could be limited in granting
injunctive relief for the same principles which preclude non-proprietor'municipalities from adopting regulations affecting aircraft operations. Enforcement of
lease-based regulations by termination of leasehold interests would present an
equally thorny problem, particularly where an airline with a long-term lease has
paid for or participated in the financing of substantial terminal improvements,
creating claims for reimbursement of substantial sums.
' The FAA has taken this position in litigation with the City of Long Beach. See
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14 n. 11. Alaskan Airlines, Inc. v.
City of Long Beach (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 86-661).
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allocated under a scheme which leaves neither airport
proprietors nor the federal government in clear control.
Neither has unfettered discretion to achieve its goals at
the expense of the objectives of the other. The allocation
of authority thus institutionalizes an underlying conflict
between the two levels of government. It is a classic study
in federalism - the national interest in promoting transportation versus the local interest in preserving the quality of life in residential neighborhoods near airports.
Unfortunately, these conflicting goals cannot be fully
achieved simultaneously and the determination whether
both are being adequately served depends on the perspective of the arbiter.
The scheme places virtually exclusive responsibility for
the safe, orderly, and efficient utilization of the country's
airspace in the hands of the FAA. This power is uniformly
understood to preempt: all local efforts to participate in
the certification of aircraft, mechanics, and pilots; the establishment and maintenance of the country's air navigation facilities; and the management and control of the
nation's airspace. As stated by Justice Jackson in another
context, "[p]lanes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally
certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands. 2 The question of local authority to regulate the environmental side effects of the use of federally
controlled airspace is, however, subject to considerably
greater controversy.
In 1968, section 611 was added to the Act. 3 It directed
the Administrator of the FAA to "prescribe and amend
such regulations as the FAA may find necessary to provide
for the control and abatement of aircraft noise and sonic
- Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2.1 Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1431 (1982)).
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booms."' 24 The Senate Committee, which reported favorably on this amendment, adopted the following description
of the preemptive sweep
of the provisions of the Act relat25
ing to noise control:
[T]he courts have held that the Federal Government presently preempts the field of noise regulation insofar as it
involves controlling theflight of aircraft ....H.R. 3400...
would not change this preemption. State and local governments will remain unable to use their police powers to
control aircraft noise by regulating the flight of aircraft.
However, the proposed legislation will not affect the
rights of a State or local public agency, as the proprietor
of an airport, from issuing regulations or establishing requirements as to the permissible level of noise which can
be created by aircraft using the airport .... The issue is
the service desired by the airport owner and the steps it is
willing to take to obtain the service. In dealing with this
issue, the Federal Government should not substitute its
judgment for that of the States or elements of local government who, for the most part, own and operate our Nation's airports. The proposed legislation is not designed
to do this ....
While it is clear that Congress intended airport proprietors to have the power to limit noise, the language of the
statute does not expressly preserve the proprietor's right
to use its police powers to achieve that goal. As such, some
have argued that the preservation of the airport operator's authority was limited to the sorts of rights it enjoys
as a private property owner, excluding the powers exercised by reason of the municipality's status as a governmental agency.
This argument is fundamentally inconsistent with the
principle that local police powers are presumed to survive
49 U.S.C. app. § 1431(b)(1) (1982). This section was amended in 1972 to
require the FAA to consult with the EPA before adopting noise standards and
regulations. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, § 7(b), 86 Stat. 1239 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1431 (1982)).
' S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONo.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2688, 2693-94 (emphasis added). The passage originally appeared in a letter sent to the Committee from the Secretary ofTransportation. Id.
24
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federal legislative action unless there is an explicit statement by Congress to the contrary. As the Court stated in
Burbank, "we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. ' 26 The argument is also contradicted by statements made in earlier congressional hearings on the problems of aircraft noise which suggest that
Congress was aware that unless it acted explicitly, the proprietor's police powers would be presumed to continue.
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reporting on a prior version of the noise control
27
legislation adopted in 1968, stated:
Until Federal action is taken, the local governmental authorities
must be deemed to possess the police power necessary to protect their
citizens and property from the unreasonable invasion of aircraft
noise. The wisdom of exercising such power or the manner
of the exercise is a problem to be resolved on the local
governmental level.... Airports in the United States, as a
general rule, are operated by a local governmental authority, either a municipality, a county, or some independent
unit. These airport operators are closer, both geographically and politically, to the problem of the conflict of interests between those citizens who have been adversely
•, Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)). The Burbank Court went on to state that the "[c]ontrol of noise
is of course deep-seated in the police power of the States." Id at 638. The argument that the adoption of section 611 eliminates the proprietor's police powers is
also contradicted by the Senate Committee's adoption of the Secretary of Transportation's statement that the legislation will not affect the right of a local agency
to issue "regulations" or "establish requirements" as to permissable levels of
noise. S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2688, 2694. Use of the term "regulations" implies that the proprietor's police powers are at the base of its noise control authority.
27 H.R. REP. No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1963) (emphasis added). When
section 611 was amended in 1972 to require the Administrator of the FAA to
consult with the EPA in formulating noise regulations, Congress yet again reaffirmed its refusal "to alter in any way the relationship between the authority of the
Federal government and that of State and local governments that existed.., prior
to enactment of the bill." S. REP. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4655, 4663.
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affected by the aircraft noise and the needs of the community for air commerce.
As a result of this legislative history, the DOT and FAA

originally took an extremely limited view of the preemptive impact of section 611.*28 In Burbank, the Solicitor
General seemed to adopt this limited view, advocating the

position that states and municipalities, whether or not

they were airport proprietors, could regulate aircraft noise

so long as they did not interfere with air safety or airspace

management.2 9 This contention was rejected by the
Court only insofar as it concerned non-proprietors. 3 0
Even after Burbank, DOT and FAA explicitly recognized, without using the words "police powers", that municipal proprietors may weigh environmental and
economic factors in the process of deciding what types of
noise regulations are appropriate at a particular airport,
precisely the sort of balancing undertaken when they exercise their police powers. 3 ' Indeed, by affirming the
power of the proprietor to arbitrate the local need for
commerce and the local desire for a quiet environment,

the FAA implicitly refused to interfere with the proprietor's police powers.
Despite efforts by airlines and other aviation interests to
convince the FAA and DOT to step back from this position, they have consistently refused to place additional
limits on proprietor power, primarily because they do not
" After section 611 was enacted, the FAA and DOT promulgated rules to implement that statute. In the preamble explaining those new rules, they stated that
the "[r]esponsibility for determining the permissible noise levels for aircraft using
an airport remains with the proprietor of that airport." 34 Fed. Reg. 18,355,
18,355 (1969). The FAA and DOT went on to state that the new rules were "not
intended to substitute federally determined noise levels for those more restrictive
limits determined to be necessary by individual airport proprietors in response to
the locally determined desire for quiet." It
See Burbank, 411 U.S. at 627.
.' Id.
" In 1975, the FAA and DOT invited comments regarding the airport noise
and restrictions issue. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,844 (1975). One of the options they
presented was to maintain status quo, which meant that "[t]he initiative and responsibility for developing, establishing and implementing airport restrictions
would be left to the local proprietor." Id. at 28,845.
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wish the United States to assume liability for noise damages. As the FAA explained in the FAA and DOT Noise
Abatement Policy Statement, "[w]e have been urged to
undertake - and have considered carefully and rejected
- full and complete federal preemption of the field of avi32
ation noise abatement.1
Notwithstanding evidence that Congress, the DOT, and
the FAA have consistently refused to preempt the authority of airport proprietors to exercise their traditional police powers to regulate noise, the FAA has now moved
away from recognizing that municipal proprietors may, in
the exercise of their police powers, adopt regulations generally premised on a desire to preserve the quality of the
environment.33 The reason for the effort to eliminate the
proprietor's ability to use its police powers is the sheer
breadth of that authority. It extends beyond the right to
avoid levels of noise which result in constitutional
takings. 4
The claim that the municipal proprietor's police powers
are preempted was first directly addressed in NationalAviation v. City of Hayward, where air cargo companies challenged a curfew adopted by the city, in its capacity as the
operator of the airport, which precluded flights by certain
comparatively loud aircraft during nighttime hours. The
.' FAA and DOT Noise Abatement Policy Statement, Nov. 18, 1976 (quoted in
DiPerri v. FAA, 671 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1982)).
13 The adoption of such inconsistent positions could result in a refusal by the
courts to accord significant deference to the current views of the DOT and FAA
on the preemption question. General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976);

see also Delpro Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen, 676 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir.)
(normal judicial deference to an administrative decision may not be due if the
agency has taken inconsistent positions in the past), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989
(1982).
-1While police power assuredly empowers the municipality to protect neighborhoods from unlivable conditions, it also gives local governmental agencies discretion "to lay out zones where ... the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people." Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1, 9 (1974); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("[M]orality, peace
and quiet, law and order - these are some of the more conspicuous examples of
the traditional applications of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they
merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.").
--418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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court rejected the challenge, stating:36
If Justice Douglas' comments regarding the need for a
'uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation' prove
correct, Congress and the FAA can take the appropriate
steps to provide such a regulatory system. [Footnote omitted.] However, at the present time, Congress and the FAA
do not appear to have preempted the area ....
Congress has not, since the NationalAviation decision in
1976, sought to expand the scope of federal preemption.
In the Deregulation Act of 1978, Congress eliminated the
pervasive power of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
over routes, rates, and services. In so doing, Congress
made it clear that the elimination of federal control was
not intended to permit states or localities to exercise such
powers.3 7 Nevertheless, Congress explicitly reconfirmed
the power of municipalities, acting as proprietors, to exer38
cise their traditional rights to regulate airport affairs.
The issue of the effect of the Act, following deregulation, on proprietor power was raised less directly in Santa
Monica Airport Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica.3 9 There, representatives of non-commercial aircraft operators challenged a collection of regulations, which ranged from a
limitation on training flights to an exclusion of jets, on
grounds that the proprietor's powers were strictly limited
to those specifically required to avoid fifth amendment liability under Griggs. The court refused to adopt that view,
3t Id. at 424-25.
-1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (Supp. III 1985). The House Report on the Deregulation Act states that "H.R. 12611 will prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations by providing that when a carrier operates under authority granted pursuant
to Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act, no State may regulate that carrier's routes,
rates or services." H. R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. Naws 3751-52.

- As stated in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(b) (1982):
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to limit
the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or any interstate agency or other political agency of two or more States as the
owner or operator of an airport served by an air carrier certificated
by the Board to exercise its proprietary powers and rights.
Id.
659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981).
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40
however, stating:

The problem with this argument is that it assumes that
Griggs liability is limited to Fifth Amendment takings.
Nothing in Griggs indicates such a limitation. Liability may
well be imposed upon a municipality on theories other
than inverse condemnation. The City of Santa Monica
should be allowed to define the threshold of its liability,
and to enact noise ordinances under the municipal-proprietor exemption if it has a rational belief that the ordinance
will reduce the possibility of liability or enhance the quality of the city's human environment.

In sum, Congress has neither explicitly nor implicitly
preempted the right of municipal airport proprietors to
utilize their police powers in the effort to protect adjacent
communities from excessive noise. Nevertheless, those
seeking to limit the breadth of that power argue that the
dominance of the federal interest in interstate commerce
requires that proprietor regulations be subject to strictju-1 Id. at 104 n.5. The question of whether Burbank preempts state efforts to
regulate noise through application of state judicial remedies for noise deemed
excessive has not been finally resolved. In California, nuisance and personal injury causes of action are available in addition to inverse condemnation. See Baker
v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, 39 Cal. 3d 862, 872, 705 P.2d
866, 872, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1985) (action against airport authority by nearby
residents for inverse condemnation and nuisance), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1200
(1986) and Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26
Cal. 3d 86, 97, 603 P.2d 1329, 1337, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979) (city sued by
homeowners on a nuisance theory for personal injuries sustained as a result of
excessive noise from aircraft using city's airport), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
State nuisance liability has also been upheld in Kruger v. Mitchell, 112 Wis. 2d 88,
332 N.W.2d 733 (1983)(state court award of damages in a nuisance action for
unreasonable noise levels found not to be preempted by Federal Aviation Act)
and in Owen v. City of Atlanta, 157 Ga. App. 354, 277 S.E.2d 338 (198 1)(nuisance
and trespass claims of homeowners not preempted by federal regulations), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1983). The Seventh Circuit has determined, on the other
hand, that state statutory remedies for excessive noise have been preempted.
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975) (owners of property
near airport could not maintain action for nuisance and common-law negligence
under state statute). A few state courts have agreed. Bryski v. City of Chicago,
148 Ill. App. 3d 556, 499 N.E.2d 162 (1986)(nuisance and trespass claims of residents near airport were preempted by federal regulation of air commerce);
Drybread v. City of St. Louis, 634 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)(residents and
landowners near airport denied relief in suit against city for trespass, nuisance,
and adverse condemnation).
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dicial scrutiny, under which the proprietor bears a heavy
burden of proof. This question is discussed below.
B.

The Scope ofJudicial Review of ProprietorNoise And
Access Regulations

Having established that proprietors are empowered to
adopt noise regulations in the exercise of their police
powers, we must next determine the scope of those powers. As we shall see, to recite that the proprietor may not
act irrationally, discriminate invidiously, or burden commerce unduly is not to answer the question. Compelling
arguments can invariably be made in support and in opposition to every ordinance which restricts commerce in
the interests of environmental quality. The true scope of
proprietor power, then, is effectively determined by the
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when its exercise is
challenged. The real issue, in other words, is what degree
of deference are these noise regulations to be given when
their reasonableness is attacked.
Those who regard proprietor power as a limited and
easily abused exception to federal preemption point to
statements by the Second Circuit in British Airways Bd. v.
Port Auth. (Concorde II), 4 1 as compelling close review of
proprietor regulations. There, the court said that the "extremely limited role Congress has reserved for airport
proprietors in our system of aviation management" re4' 564 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Concorde II]. In Concorde , the first
case the Second Circuit heard involving the New York Port Authority's effort to
exclude the Concorde from Kennedy Airport, the court reversed a district court
decision enjoining the Port Authority's prohibition. British Airways Bd. v. Port
Auth., 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Concorde 1]. The circuit court held
that the Port Authority had the power and responsibility to establish fair, evenhanded and nondiscriminatory regulations designed to abate the effect of aircraft
noise on surrounding communities. Id. at 84.
Subsequently, however, the Port Authority "demonstrated total resistance in
responding to the airlines' desire to secure a fair test of [the Concorde] in New
York," and the Second Circuit, in Concorde II, enjoined further prohibition of the
supersonic jet airliner. 564 F.2d at 1005. The circuit court held that this injunction was to remain in effect "until the Port Authority promulgates a reasonable,
nonarbitrary, and nondiscriminatory noise regulation that all aircraft are afforded
an equal opportunity to meet." Id.
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quires that the court "carefully scrutinize all exercises of
local power under this rubric to insure that impermissible
parochial considerations do not unconstitutionally burden
interstate commerce or inhibit the accomplishment of legitimate national goals."4 2 On the other hand, the great
weight of authority adopts a much more deferential standard of review.
The two most careful opinions on the subject of the
standards to be applied in testing the constitutionality of
noise regulations are the district court decisions in Santa
Monica45 and NationalAviation.44 In the Santa Monica case,
the regulations at issue were challenged under the
supremacy, equal protection, and commerce clauses as
unreasonable and unduly discriminatory. 45 Judge Hill rejected the Supremacy Clause challenge for the reasons
discussed above.46 With respect to equal protection, he
47

stated:

Each of the ordinances in question, for equal protection
purposes, must be regarded as an economic regulation.
None of the five ordinances involves any suspect classification or the regulation or control of fundamental personal
Concorde 11, 564 F.2d at 1010-11.
4-481 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aft'd, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981).
44 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
45 Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. at 935. The ordinances attacked included city
regulations imposing a night curfew, banning weekend and holiday touch-and-go,
stop-and-go and low approach operations, and imposing single event noise exposure levels. Id. at 930-31. The court held that these ordinances did not violate the
supremacy, equal protection, or commerce clauses. Id. at 938-43. A ban of all jet
flights, however, was held to violate the equal protection and commerce clauses
because some excluded jets were quieter than some permitted propeller aircraft.
Id. at 943-44.
4,1l at 935-38; see supra notes 12-40.
4 Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. at 935; see also Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v.
Fulton County, 561 F. Supp. 667, 669 (N.D. Ga. 1982). The court noted in Hill
Aircraft that:
[W]here no fundamental rights or suspect classes are involved, as in
this case, the action of the County in treating the two operators differently need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate interest. Where a legitimate state interest can be conceived, and where
the state action is rationally related thereto, equal protection requirements are satisfied.
Id at 679 n.10 (citations omitted).
42
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rights. As the Supreme Court puts it, to validate such economic regulations, it is required only that the regulations,
and the classification established thereby, be found to be
'rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'

This is clearly a standard of deference to the local legislative judgment rather than a test which permits judicial reconsideration of the proprietor's policy decisions.
The commerce clause test used in Santa Monica was
adopted from Judge Peckham's decision in NationalAvia48
tion. There, the court stated:
[T]he first question to be determined is whether [the regulation has] ... an effect on interstate commerce for if there

is no effect, there is no need for further inquiry. Assuming
that there is an effect, the next issue is whether the legislative body 'has acted within its province, and whether the
means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the
end sought.' S.C. Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177, 190, 58 S. Ct. 510, 517, 82 L. Ed. 734 (1938). The
inquiry here also focuses on whether the legislative action
discriminates against interstate commerce. Id. at 189, 58
S. Ct. 510. It is after this point where there appears to be
some conflict in the analysis to be used.
Judge Peckham then proceeded to review what he regarded as two lines of Supreme Court authority on the
proper standard for determining if the burden imposed
on commerce by a reasonably tailored and nondiscriminatory local ordinance would render the ordinance void.
-' NationalAviation, 418 F. Supp. at 425-26. The court's evaluation whether an
ordinance is "reasonably adapted" to the end sought hinges on its finding that
there is a reasonable nexus between the subject matter of the legislation and the
result sought to be achieved. If the question is fairly debatable, the legislation
must be upheld. It is not the function of the court to decide whether the regulation actually achieves its intended purpose, so long as the legislature might have
reasonably believed that the adopted means would promote the desired ends. See
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680 (198 1)(Brennan, J., concurring);
see also City of Houston v. FAA, 679 F.2d 1184, 1193 (5th Cir. 1982); Western
Airlines v. Port Auth., 658 F. Supp. 952, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(concluding that the
"decision of the Legislature should be accepted unless [the court] can say that it is
wide of any reasonable mark.")(quotingJustice Holmes' dissent in Louisville Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)).
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On the one hand, the Supreme Court has articulated a
test which seems to call for a weighing of the burden on
commerce and the local benefit. As stated by Judge
49
Peckham:
The Supreme Court's most recent formulation of this
standard appeared in Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970):
'Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.'
Judge Peckham also perceived a second, and even more
deferential standard, which provides that no "balancing"
need be undertaken where the regulation involves a matter of "peculiarly local concern." 5 0 In such a case, "once
it is determined that the legislation is a reasonable means
of achieving a nondiscriminatory, legitimate goal, it
should be deemed constitutional without need for further
inquiry."' 5 1 Judges Peckham and Hill assumed that avia- Id. at 426.
NationalAviation, 418 F. Supp. at 426.
5, Id. (citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.
Isl. & Pac. R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968), where the Court stated:
The District Court's responsibility for making 'findings of fact' certainly does not authorize it to resolve conflicts in the evidence
against the legislature's conclusion or even to reject the legislative
judgment on the basis that without convincing statistics in the record
to support it, the legislative viewpoint constitutes . . . 'pure speculation'. . . . Nor was it open to the District Court to place a value on the

[benefits of the statute] in terms of dollars and cents, in order to see
whether this value, as calculated by the court, exceeded the cost.
Id. at 138-39.); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938). In Barnwell Bros., the Court explained that:
Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate interstate
commerce, may determine whether the burdens imposed on it by
state regulation, otherwise permissible, are too great, and may, by
legislation designed to secure uniformity or in other respects to protect the national interests in the commerce, curtail to some extent
the state's regulatory power. But that is a legislative, not a judicial
function. .

.

. And in reviewing a state highway regulation where

Congress has not acted, a court is not called upon, as are state legislatures, to determine what, in its judgment, is the most suitable restriction to be applied of those that are possible, or to choose that
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tion noise control qualified under this test,52 thus making

it unnecessary to balance the "putative local benefits" of
rational and nondiscriminatory noise control ordinances
against the burdens they might impose on interstate commerce. 53 For present purposes, while airport proprietor's
one which in its opinion is best adapted to all the diverse interests
affected.
Id. at 189-90; accord Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 143 (1927) ("In the absence of
national legislation especially covering the subject of interstate commerce, the
state may rightly prescribe uniform regulations adapted to promote safety on its
highways and the conservation of their use.").
32 See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)
(air pollution); Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 187 (highways "built, owned and maintained by the state or its municipal subdivisions"); Construction Indus. Ass'n v.
City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1975) (housing and zoning ordinance to control city growth), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). But see Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981), where the Court adopted
the Pike articulation of the commerce clause test in a case involving "environmental protection and resource conservation" (matters which certainly sound like "peculiarly local interests").
33 NationalAviation, 418 F. Supp. at 427; Santa Monica. 481 F. Supp. at 936-38.
The Supreme Court has not finally resolved the question when, if ever, the courts
are to weigh the local benefits of a regulation against the burdens it imposes on
interstate commerce. Compare Pike (balancing appropriate where regulation
sought to improve state's reputation as a producer of superior cantaloupes) and
Barnwell Bros., (rational basis sufficient where regulation concerned matter of local
highway safety) with Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(198 1)(no test drew a majority) and Clover Leaf Creamery Co., (appearing to use balancing test in manner involving environmental conservation). Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Kassel is illuminating as to the contribution of that decision in clarifying
the state of the law ("we know only that Iowa's law is invalid and that the jurisprudence of the 'negative side' of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused.") Kassel, 450 U.S. at 706.
For a thoughtful and thorough review of the issue, see generally Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
Mscn. L. REV. 1091 (1986)(author concludes not only that balancing is invariably
inappropriate, but that the Court has never really done so anyway). Airport proprietors who support this view will take some solace in Justice Scalia's concurrence in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987), where the
Justice states that if Professor Regan is not correct, "he ought to be." Id. at 1653.
In support of this view, see Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675 (plurality agreed that a regulation which does not discriminate ought generally to be accorded "special deference" because the "burden usually falls on local economic interests as well as
other States' economic interests" which assures that the "State's own political
processes will serve as a check against unduly burdensome regulations") and
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 184-85 ("Underlying the state rule [of deference] has
been the thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation is
of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state,
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are

394

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[53

will obviously prefer the standard of highest deference, it
is important that both tests preclude judges from substituting their judgments on matters of legitimate legislative
concern for that of locally elected officials. 54
The position advocated by those favoring heightened
judicial scrutiny is further weakened by a collection of
statements coming from the Second Circuit. First, the
court has uniformly announced its respect for the doctrine of separation of powers and the principles of federalism which restrict federal intrusions into matters which
are peculiarly local in character.
In British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. (Concorde 1),55 for example, that court stated, "[t]he inherently local aspect of
noise control can be most effectively left to the operator,
as the unitary local authority who controls airport access.
It has always seemed fair to assume that the operator will
act in a rational manner in weighing the commercial benefits of proposed service against its costs, both economic
and political." ' 56 A similar view was taken in Global Int'l
Airways v. Port Auth. ,57 in which the Port Authority was permitted, against a preemption challenge, to require air carnormally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state"); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) ("Some... laws
embody convictions which judges are likely to share. Some may not. But a Constitution... is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident
of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even shocking,
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.") (Holmes J.,
dissenting).
- It may be argued that the most deferential standard is reserved for cases
where a third prerequisite is met: the ordinance must not concern a matter as to
which national uniformity of regulation is inherently essential. Even assuming
this is the proper view, however, the control of community noise from aircraft
operations, as is demonstrated by Congress' consistent refusal to preempt the
field, cannot be said to impinge on an area requiring national uniformity.
15 558 F.2d at 83. For an analysis of the Concorde I and Concorde IIdecisions, see
supra note 41.
r" Concorde 1, 558 F.2d at 83; see also Concorde II,564 F.2d at 1011 (court stating
that it seemed fair "to assume that the proprietor's intimate knowledge of local
conditions, as well as his ability to acquire property and air easements and assume
compatible land uses, . . . would result in a rational weighing of the costs and
benefits of the proposed service"). Id. (citation omitted).
• 727 F.2d 246, modified, 731 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1984).
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riers to utilize newer technology aircraft in an increasing
proportion of their operations.58
Moreover, in each of the cases in which the Second Circuit has addressed the issue of proprietor power, the
court has adopted a formulation which allows the proprietor flexibility in addressing the problems of noise, so long
as its rules are "reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory ....,,"The court did not propose that the test of

preemption, or the standard for determining whether a
regulation unduly burdens commerce, should be modified
or applied differently in the noise context, let alone that
the presumption of constitutionality generally accorded to
governmental regulations ought not to prevail in this context.6 0 To the contrary, the purpose of giving noise regulations close scrutiny was expressly limited to the need to
assure that "impermissible parochial considerations" did
not lead to "undue" (and thus "unconstitutional") interGlobal Int'lAirways, 727 F.2d at 252.
Concorde I, 558 F.2d at 84; Concorde II, 564 F.2d at 1011; see Global Int'lAirways,
727 F.2d at 250-51. On the basis of the Second Circuit decisions, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "[t]he reasonable inference, not contradicted by the legislative
history, is that Congress intended to allow a municipality flexibility in fashioning
its noise regulations." Santa Monica, 659 F.2d at 104-105 (citations omitted).
-oSee Air Trans. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975). That court
began its analysis of a challenge to a system of noise regulations adopted by the
state of California for airports that it did not own or operate by acknowledging
"the presumption of constitutionality with which [the scheme of regulation]
comes to us." Id.at 63 (citations omitted); see also, Santa Monica, 659 F.2d at 105
(court stating that "(t]he principles of comity and federalism militate against our
invalidating a state or local regulation unless it is written in unlawful terms, or
because, on its face, it is preempted"); cf Port of N. Y. Auth. v. Eastern Air Lines,
259 F. Supp. 745, 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)("When dealing with a quasi-public corporation charged with the duty of operating and managing a number of airports in
the public interest and for the benefit of the entire public, including residents of
the neighboring communities as well as the airlines, any doubt as to the reasonableness of its regulations should be resolved in its favor.").
In addition a party challenging the constitutionality of a local ordinance must
"negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Lehnhausen v. Lake
Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)(citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S.
83, 88 (1940)); see also Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 469; Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617
(1960); Western Int'l Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387 F. Supp.
429, 437-38 (D. Nev. 1975), modified, 440 U.S. 392 (1979) (proposition cited not
affected).
'
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ference with commerce. 6 '
It follows, as stated by the authors of the amendments
to the Act giving the FAA power to promulgate noise regulations, that no branch of the federal government, executive or judicial, "should . . . substitute its judgment
[regarding acceptable noise burdens] for that of the States
or elements of local government who, for
the most part,
62
own and operate our Nation's airports.
IV.

THERE

Is No

THREAT TO THE AIR TRANSPORT

SYSTEM WHICH REQUIRES A CHANGE IN THE

PRESENT ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY

More than 15 years ago, the United States Supreme
Court suggested that if the City of Burbank were permitted to enact a curfew on flights at an airport it neither
owned nor operated, other similarly situated municipalities would likely follow suit, threatening the integrity of
the national air transport system. 63 Thus was born the
principle that proprietors may, and non-proprietors may
not, regulate the noise impacts of airport operations. In
the intervening years, the scope of proprietor liability has
expanded as quickly as the transportation system.6 4 It is
hardly surprising, then, that proprietor efforts to limit
noise have kept pace with their financial exposure.
There is, however, no tangible evidence that limits on
airport access designed to enforce limits on aircraft noise
have interdicted interstate commerce, made it impossible
for passengers to travel, caused goods left on warehouse
floors, or materially distorted any interstate market for
goods or services.65 To be sure, so long as the system
- Concorde II, 564 F.2d at 1011-12.
S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2688, 2694.
City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
'- See supra note 49.
62

There is, to the contrary, compelling evidence that the perceived threat to
the national system has been exaggerated. Take, for example, the experience of
the airport whose noise problems precipitated the leading Supreme Court decision - the Burbank Airport. Despite the fact that this airport was acquired (in
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permits proprietors to share in the regulatory authority,
some of the costs of air transportation previously imposed
on airport neighbors in the form of adverse environmental impacts will be shifted quite directly to the users of the
air transport system in the form of more costly transportation service.6 6 The users, however, are the most capable
of spreading the costs among those who receive the benefits. The shifting of these costs cannot constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce in the Constitutional
sense and the system of shared responsibility for noise
control need not be changed in order to limit the extent
to which the costs of interstate commerce may be imposed
directly, rather67than indirectly, on those who most immediately benefit.
1978) by a public agency formed by the Cities of Burbank, Glendale, and
Pasadena, precisely so that the affected cities could adopt noise regulations, the
number of flights and the level of passenger service at the airport have increased
continuously and significantly (while cummulative noise in the community has
reduced).
New technology (less noisy) aircraft cost substantially more than older (and
noisier) airplanes. Other things being equal, it may therefore be assumed that a
ticket on an airline which has acquired such planes as a result of noise restrictions
will cost more as well. Even where noise restrictions exclude particular users who
cannot afford the more expensive equipment, however, there are always alternatives to the specific transportation service. For example, while the number of
flights, and thus the number of air carriers, at the Long Beach Airport is restricted, there is no point of destination or origin which cannot be reached from
one of the other airports in the Los Angeles basin. Further, the suggestion that
one of the limited number of carriers at Long Beach could abuse its oligopolistic
position and gouge the traveller is belied by the availability of service from other
carriers who could provide comparable travel opportunities out of Long Beach if
alternate services were more profitable. Similar opportunities to utilize alternate
transportation are available in each region in which airport proprietors have imposed significant noise or access regulations. Indeed, the self-checking principle
discussed in Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675 and Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 187, appears to
have led airports in regions which have a compelling need for additional air service to refrain from adopting objectionable restrictions.
'3 See Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 187-188, where the Court stated:
Congress not acting, state regulation of interstate carriers has been
upheld regardless of its effects on interstate commerce. With respect to the extent and nature of local interests to be protected and
the unavoidable effect upon interstate and intrastate commerce
alike, regulations of the use of the highways are akin to local regulations of rivers, harbors, piers and docks, quarantine regulations, and
game laws which, Congress not acting, have been sustained even
though they materially interfere with interstate commerce.
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Certainly the fact that litigation costs will be incurred
whenever a sufficiently heated dispute arises over the adequacy of the justification for a particular noise or noiserelated access restriction does not itself dictate the conclusion that the present allocation of authority is fundamentally flawed. The only way to avoid such costs would
be to place extensive and unbridled authority in the hands
of one of the participants in the system of shared authority. That solution, while efficient, runs counter to the continuously reinforced principles of federalism under which
local governments, which are closest to the problem, and
the national government, which has a broader perspective, share authority over issues having both local and national implications. 68
Mr. Ellett's suggestion that "the current allocation of
responsibility and authority is inadequate," either because
it does not provide all of the players the tools "to achieve
their goals" or because administrative hurdles make such
Id. (citation and footnote omitted); see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,
437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978)("interstate Commerce is not subjected to an impermissible burden simply because an otherwise valid regulation causes some business
to shift from one interstate supplier to another").
- The assertion that proprietor noise restrictions will not be the undoing of the
system is not, of course, a claim that the system may not be undone anyway.
There is no denying that recent growth in demand for air service has been significant. The solution to the capacity problem, however, will not come on the back of
any one element of the system. The FAA will have to increase significantly the
number of controllers and other FAA oversight personnel in order to enhance the
capacity of the system to handle peak hour demand within the confines of safety.
Use of aircraft (now operated, on average, at less than 70 percent of capacity) will
have to be increased. Further de-peaking of air carrier schedules will have to occur (the substantial majority of flights now being focused within a small minority
of the hours when those flights could be flown). Airport proprietors will have to
make a good faith effort to reassess where the line is to be drawn between increases in service and increases in noise, and try (where appropriate) to change
community attitudes toward increase in service. New airports will have to be built
notwithstanding the political difficulty and enormous expense which this aspect of
the solution entails. (Indeed, the unwillingness of local agencies to support new
airports is a direct result of legitimate fears that if they allow a new airport to be
built, the "national interest" in expansion and the power of the FAA may conspire
to place the control of its environmental impacts beyond the authority of the municipality. Such a fear can hardly be considered "unreasonable paraochial
intransigence.")
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an outcome "enormously difficult," 69 thus appears, on
closer scrutiny, to be supported only by the assertion that
the system does not work because it does not allow the
FAA and the users of the transportation system to achieve
their goals at the expense of the interests of the other participants. The call for changes in the allocation of authority or the rules under which it may be exercised is less a
plea for a new process, than an effort to secure a different
substantive result. It seems that Mr. Ellett does not seek
an accommodation of all of the participants' interests,
rather he endeavors to assure that the transportation industry's concerns are satisfied notwithstanding the contrary environmental objectives of local communities. Our
system of federalism does not permit such a triumph of
national interests over legitimate concerns of local communities absent a congressional mandate - an action
Congress has consistently refused to take in the area of
aviation noise.
V.

CONCLUSION

E. Tazwell Ellett ascribes to airlines and other airport
users a desire for "access to any airport at any time, with
an aircraft the user chooses to use, and without unreasonable cost or other obstacles. 70° His sympathy for this position is clear. What is equally apparent is that
proprietors have a right, even an obligation, to place limits on those same users in order to control the proprietor's liability and the environmental effects of airport
noise on surrounding communities.
Congress, of course, has the power to change the allocation of financial responsibility and contemporaneously
withdraw from proprietors the correlative authority to
regulate. The FAA, however, has consistently refused to
support the proposal for full and complete federal preemption because of the enormous financial exposure
v. Ellett, supra note 4, at 14.
7To Id at 25.
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which would be shifted to the federal government.7 1 Mr.
Ellett correctly notes that FAA's refusal to adopt the proposal for complete preemption will permit a continuation
of local restrictions which effectively raise the costs of interstate transportation. We suggest, however, that these
costs will inevitably be passed on to the traveling public,
resulting in a system in which the cost of an airline ticket
will more closely approach the true cost of air transportation by encompassing not only the value of facilities,
equipment, salaries, and fuel, but the economic and
human burdens of noise as well.

7'
While airport proprietors and local governments are undoubtedly split on
the viability of the preemption proposal, none is prepared to allow the federal
government, unless it accepts that liability, to substitute its assessment of the benefits and burdens of air commerce for that of the local proprietor.

